


Al-Aqsa Flood

Contexts and Implications



Written By:
Ahmed Abu Suhaib



[Translated and formatted by **Resistance Music & Media** – t.me/PalestineTunes]



Cover Photo: I made sure that the cover photo included the picture of the martyr that has always been with me on my social media account, "Facebook."

Chapter One:

The Contexts of The Flood

Introduction

In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

Praise be to Allah, who created us on Earth and made us successors in it to populate it by establishing the truth and serving creation. Prayers and peace be upon our struggling Prophet, who led the most sacred moral project known to the world, to liberate people from people and to separate their dependencies for the Lord of people. He was expelled from his home and deprived of his homeland, and he fought continuous and arduous rounds of conflict, in which he tasted with his companions and the men of his prophetic project; victory at Badr, defeat at Uhud, and the siege at Shaab. The eyes of his companions were dimmed with fear in Al-Khandaq, and he lost the best of his men at Uhud and Mu'tah. The polytheists treacherously hurt him at Raji' and Mu'awiyah, and the hypocrites exhausted him in Medina with their slander. But he continued on his path and continued in his endeavor until Allah completed the matter for him, taking the necessary measures and relying on Allah's company and success. And now...

The October 7 attack took place, followed by a brutal military attack against the [Gaza] Strip, opening up internal debate and questions, even among the supporters of the resistance, about the correctness or incorrectness of the decision. Most of these questions and others are in fact the product of the pain and brutal suffering imposed by the occupation on the residents of the [Gaza] Strip, and are not objective questions in a natural context outside the scope of the terrible cauterization of consciousness practiced by the Zionist machine of oppression.

This book is not intended to enter into debate, criticism, or justification, but rather to shed some light on the strategy of the conflict in general, and to maintain collective awareness regarding our arduous and long liberation project.

This book is an attempt to deconstruct events and to look at them rationally and objectively, according to the principles governing the national liberation project, because any dealing with the Palestinian cause and its events away from considering it a national liberation project will always lead us to erroneous positions and distorted conclusions.

This battle, among all battles, is the war on Palestinian awareness and belief in the cause. This was not a marginal goal or a side effect of the course of the battle, but rather a major part of the strategic goals of the battle for the enemy, and this requires a corresponding awareness, which is the goal of issuing this book.

I do not write in isolation from the scene or as a distant observer. Rather, I write from the heart of the suffering that we all share in Gaza, and we experience all its difficult and arduous details. However, I insist that thinking should remain based on awareness and not expressing pain.

I have always said that the duty of people of opinion and thought, and the requirement of their trust, is to direct the masses towards what is settled in their conscience as correct, not to go along with the desires of the masses and embellish their whims in the hope of pleasing the reader or praising the follower.

I advise the honorable reader to read the entire book before taking a position or opinion about the book or the events it discusses.

Ahmed Abu Suhaib

Gaza 12/14/2024

Philosophy of Liberation Experiences

Resistance to the occupier is, in essence, resistance by an extremely weak force to an extremely strong force, thereby raising the cost of occupation. The occupier exerts all violence available to eliminate or suppress the resistance, and the resistance continues to endure the successive and escalating reactions of the occupier until the occupier reaches a desperate self-conviction that it cannot do more than it has done. While the resistance shows no signs of retreat, the occupation project begins to disintegrate.

The fact that a resistance raises the cost of occupation does not mean raising the cost on one party, which is the occupation. This is a completely false and deceptive concept, and contradicts almost all historical facts. The real truth is that it raises the cost on the occupation, while raising the cost many times over on the people under occupation.

All the peoples who were liberated paid a price for resisting their occupier, many times what they would have paid if they had capitulated to them and coexisted with them. However, their loss in coexistence is much greater than their loss in resistance, because in reality they will lose something greater than blood and pain. They will lose their identity and their future...!

The generations that resist the occupation, most of them die paying the price, while the few who witness the occupation and resist it, are given the opportunity to witness the liberation for the rest of their lives, and they often spend this remainder in restoring what the occupation has spoiled, or resisting its overt and covert remnants.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

Resistance is not a process that a generation undertakes in order to reap the gains. It is a process of sacrifice by a generation or several generations in order for a new generation to gain. As for the generation of the revolution, it is sufficient that it has gained its historical dignity, fulfilled its national trust, and did not contribute, through submission, to obliterating the identity of its sons and wasting the future of its descendants.

It is a kind of injustice to the wheel of history and drowning it in the bad luck of a generation that saw the light under the darkness of occupation without its will or desire, but it is the essence of human behavior that transcends races and strikes deep into the roots of history, where grandfathers offer to ancestors and fathers lead their battle on behalf of their sons.

This abstract materialistic perspective left no excuse for a people who do not resist, even if they have no religion or belief, so how about someone whose belief is that their worldly life is nothing but a small test for another real life, for whom the first seems like just the blink of an eye, and the suffering in the first only increases the breadth in the other that never ends?

This abstract philosophy of occupation and resistance to it has been fought by the peoples of God on Earth throughout history, and you can hardly find the experience of a people who were fed up with paying the price of freedom; except that their identity was lost, or their battle was postponed to the next generations when their human, cultural, and ethnic genes do not match the genes of the foreign immigrant who wants to be authentic, and then the next generations pay exactly and completely, if not more, what the first generations should have paid in their revolution for liberation, while the generations of coexistence with the occupation did not reap anything but years of humiliation and wandering with the shame of history that cannot be erased.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

There is a model of half resistance or half revolution, in which the people wage a revolution against the occupation, its stick hurting them, then the occupation waves a carrot at them and they take it as a lifeline, then they discover that there is no salvation in this carrot, so they revolt again, and the stick is renewed and the carrots are diversified, and so on, until they pay an accumulated and divided price, double or multiples, of what they should have paid if they had waged one complete revolution without halves.

Hesitation to pay the price, or pay part of it, and then retreat under the pressure of pain, will not reduce the total price of liberation, but rather double it, and with it double the life of the occupation as well as the wasted life of the occupied peoples.

We must not forget the human truth in this regard: resisting the occupier is not a decision chosen by a group of an occupied people, but it is quite simply a duty that everyone must perform. Whoever does not resist the occupier is not classified as neutral or wise; rather, he is a traitor or a coward. The consciousness that is distorted to its utmost limits cannot consider negligence in this national duty a kind of wisdom or some kind of tact...!

The Enemy's Strategy Before The Flood

Before the [Al-Aqsa] Flood, the enemy was facing three main enemies that posed varying challenges to the enemy: the existential danger coming from Iran, the terrifying threat coming from Lebanon, and the chronic disturbance in Gaza. The enemy was not in a hurry to deal with these challenges, but it was always in a state of readiness and preparedness, so much so that most of its training in recent years before the [Al-Aqsa] Flood was centered around multi-front warfare, and it carried out a large number of maneuvers in recent period, simulating a simultaneous war on three fronts.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

The enemy was dealing with Gaza as a chronic headache in terms of impact, but it needed a major surgical operation in terms of the ability to treat. The enemy's policy was to be content with taking the cheapest painkillers and living with this headache until the appropriate circumstances came to enter into a major surgical operation. The enemy knew that the cost of getting rid of Gaza by ground war would be very costly and complicated, and for this reason it was content with containing Gaza and working to reduce its danger.

They contained Gaza by leaving it a margin of life, and giving it some crumbs to fear for, thus limiting its outbursts and reducing the times of its excitement, and all the indicators to them suggested that Gaza was proceeding in this context according to the drawn line.

As for reducing the danger, its main pillar was represented by the huge and massive strategic project, in building the legendary border and barrier wall on the borders of the region, to uncover the offensive tunnels and remove their threat, as they represented the largest, most important and most dangerous weapon possessed by the resistance, and in this it achieved amazing successes in reality, the most prominent of which was its failure of two infiltration operations through the tunnels in the Sword of Al-Quds Battle, where it was able to uncover the crossing operation through sensors, and targeted the place with its warplanes, and all the perpetrators of the two separate operations were martyred in two different places.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

With the neutralization of the offensive tunnel weapon, it sought to neutralize other qualitative offensive combat weapons, strengthened its naval defenses, and increased the complexity of any action that could be carried out from sea, and hastened to develop the Iron Dome and increase its platforms, and it achieved great success in the Sword of Al-Quds Battle, and the resistance was forced to fire 100 rockets simultaneously at "Tel Aviv" in order to deliver a few rockets to achieve the desired effect, which is a very large number compared to what is available in the possession of the resistance.

The enemy also maintained a periodic confrontation with Gaza within the framework of the "mowing the lawn" policy, forcing Gaza to use its weapons, which prevents it from accumulating power, and at the same time exploiting every wave of escalation to strike manufacturing capabilities to hinder production and keep Gaza's capabilities under control as much as possible.

More important than all of this is tightening the siege on manufacturing resources and smuggling routes. The Egyptian regime, through its war on the people of the Sinai and the tunnels, played a prominent and effective role in this regard, and this had a great impact on Gaza's ability to arm itself, or even to repair what was lost in any battle or escalation. When we say that Gaza was manufacturing its weapons from nothing and the impossible, it is a true statement and is no exaggeration.

On top of that, there was a daily, round-the-clock battle, a very fierce and very hidden battle, which was the intelligence battle. The enemy was directing mass strikes below the belt, while the resistance was confronting that with a mad effort and vigilance that made it impossible to rest, because any small success achieved by the enemy would destroy the achievement of long years, huge sums of money, and strenuous efforts. However, the enemy was unfortunately achieving some accomplishments.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

This was the enemy's strategy, which gave them the advantage of keeping the Gaza threat stable, without the need to enter into a major ground operation. They believed that the passage of time and the achievement of greater intelligence accomplishments, along with directing more periodic harmful strikes, would give them a greater ability to reduce the size of the threat and control it, and thus postpone the need to enter into a major ground battle.

Gaza's Strategy Before The Flood

For many years, Gaza has been struggling with the siege imposed on it, first, and at the same time, trying to create an influential role for itself in the national liberation project and its thawabets (principles) related to the land, Al-Quds, and prisoners, so that the cause does not remain paralyzed while the enemy implements its plans on the ground, especially in the West Bank and Al-Quds, and changes the facts rapidly. Gaza has been carrying a real and sincere project, and is trying with all its effort to achieve an accomplishment for the sake of the cause.

It has tried many solutions and methods in this regard, between political flexibility and military confrontation, and every time it has collided with a rock that has brought it back to the starting point. It tasted the flavor of success in 2012 during the rule of the Egyptian revolution, and became more certain that it could have an impact on the enemy. It tried harder in 2014, but it collided with the regional wall of resistance that was hostile to it, if not complicit with its enemy.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

The general strategy after 2014 became not to enter into a major battle with the occupation, unless the battle would achieve tangible superiority that would enable an achievement in the siege file and one of the national thawabet (principles) files, especially the prisoners and Al-Quds. Since then, it has been accumulating strength, engaging in small, forced skirmishes with the enemy, then restoring what it had lost and completing the accumulation in a very severe shortage of capabilities and resources.

The Sword of Al-Quds Battle came amidst a good accumulation of power, and was a response to two major national thawabets (principles), the first being Al-Quds, and the second being the prisoners. In fact, the prisoners' file was the essence of the battle, except that the mission related to this file was not destined for success, as two attacks aimed at raiding enemy sites and capturing enemy soldiers failed, which would have given the resistance a new pressure card on the enemy in the siege file and the prisoners' file. Unfortunately, the ground wall system was able to thwart the attack, and the resistance faced the challenge of finding an alternative to the strategic tunnel weapon.

The idea of the return marches came at a precise, sensitive, and appropriate time. It enabled the resistance to possess means of harassing the enemy, enabling it to pressure it in the siege file, without exhausting its military strength in periodic clashes with the enemy, which would then require long periods to restore what was lost in them. Most importantly, by pure coincidence, it created a strategic alternative to the tunnel weapon.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

During the return marches, the weak points in the enemy's obstacles on the border began to become apparent, and with the success of a number of young men in crossing the border and reaching the main roads of the settlements, a new plan for the attack began to crystallize in the resistance, and it delved into studying the loopholes closely throughout the period of the return marches, and it became clear that the attack does not have to be through the few tunnels available, but rather through a broad and sudden targeting of all areas of weakness, which gives some loopholes the opportunity to achieve the required success, and some of the events of the return marches were exploited to remove some obstacles, destroy them, or influence them.

The disadvantage of this plan is that it can only be applied once, because the enemy always learns lessons and morals after any event, no matter how small, and restores and develops its defensive barriers in line with the event. Even the resistance during that period suffered from some individual operations that were well-received by the public and were called lone wolf operations, because each operation was the result of the perpetrator realizing a gap in the fence, and instead of the resistance benefiting from it as part of an integrated attack, the enemy is alerted to it and its counterparts along the dividing line, so it restores it and increases its fortifications, thus depriving the resistance of the opportunity and turning it into a threat.

A plan was crystallized that was both extremely simple and complex at the same time, and preparations and the use of weapons to serve it began. The resistance refused to be drawn into any side battle or provocation from the enemy, because the plan required every shot and every rocket to be employed in its appropriate place in the attack plan as well as in the defense plan.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

The success of the attack plan was the golden opportunity, and almost the only one available, that the resistance had been waiting for years to make a shift in the conflict with the enemy. This required extremely high secrecy in preparation, and the ability to implement it before the enemy exposed the resistance's intentions, and thus take precautions, or change the form of the obstacles and barriers on the borders with Gaza or increase their fortification.

The resistance wanted to achieve a strong and effective attack on the enemy, which would enable it to force the enemy to make fundamental concessions on the prisoners' file, the siege file, and other files. It was expected that there would be a harsh reaction from the enemy, but the expectation was also that we were able to tolerate the harsh reaction compared to the desired results of the attack.

The general strategy, according to the data and statements, was to launch a broad attack on the enemy's positions adjacent to the region, to paralyze the enemy's defenses, occupy them with themselves, and prevent them from providing mutual support among themselves, thus increasing the chance of the attack's success in a very limited group of positions, as it was expected that the attack would fail on the largest number of targeted positions, while successful attacks would achieve the required amount in order to achieve the strategic goal of the resistance and impose new equations for the conflict.

What happened was beyond all calculations, neither in terms of the resounding success of the attack, nor in terms of the hostile reaction, and Allah is the judge of His measures.

Essential Questions:

The [Al-Aqsa] Flood has happened, and there is no doubt that the October 7 attack, as a military and revolutionary act, is the most brilliant and complex military attack in the modern era. Whether we agree or disagree, it will be recorded among a group of the most brilliant military plans in history, and it will remain a source of pride and honor for the Palestinian fighter, who created from nothingness and the impossible under the strict siege from all sides of the world, the most successful military crossing against an enemy for which all the material and technological capabilities from all sides of the world were harnessed.

Then the aggression followed, and there is no doubt that it was the most brutal and barbaric aggression that any of the peoples of the region have ever experienced, in light of an absolute siege and absolute silence, and the enemy's absolute hand without accountability or supervision. The Palestinian people paid prices that we cannot say were heavy or exorbitant, because what happened in reality cannot be adequately described in any word in the dictionary of language.

As a result of this horrific, barbaric aggression, which had as its core objectives the bloody brutality of causing the greatest shock to the Palestinian consciousness and inflicting the greatest possible psychological defeat, many questions and numerous debates were raised by the opponents of the resistance, its supporters, and even many of its elements, some of which were objective, some of which were fabricated, and many of which were an outlet for pain under the pressure of killing and suffering.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

In my opinion, among all the questions raised, there are three fundamental and essential questions. The first question is whether the attack should have been postponed until we were stronger. The second question is whether it would have been better to reduce the attack to be small and limited so as not to provoke a reaction from the enemy. The third question is whether the attack provided a pretext for the brutality of the occupation.

Postponing The Attack

We must not forget that the essence of the conflict with the occupation revolves around the land, I mean around the liberation of the land as the final outcome of the revolution. This is in the witnessed and proven reality, and will not be achieved by small battles alone. Whether we like it or not, and as an inevitability and certainty, the liberation of the land will not be easy and feasible, and it will not happen by a sudden miracle or by a knockout blow in the first rounds of the fight.

Postponing the major attack today will not prevent the historical inevitability that it will inevitably be major tomorrow or the day after. What will be the difference between the price paid today and the price paid tomorrow? Except for the time period added to the life of the occupation, until we reach the same station that we have reached today, and are intended to reach tomorrow..!!

Then what are we betting on to postpone the clash?

Gaza, since the Zionist withdrawal 18 years ago, has been in a freezing room, hovering in a limbo between semi-life and semi-death, struggling, jostling, clashing, exploding, raging, calming down, bleeding, recovering, escalating, and reconciling. But whether we like it or not, the overall outcome of the conflict curve is "staying where you are."

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

The West Bank is on a steep and accelerating downward slope, with formal control by the [Palestinian] Authority and actual control by the occupation, a complete occupation but one that is ambiguous and convincing, to the point that people are accustomed to its fluctuations and have become complacent with its ferocity, anesthetized from the natural reaction to the increase in settlements, the nibbling of land, and the imposition of accelerating facts in Al-Quds, which is the core of the conflict and the axis of the cause.

The Palestinian political system and its effects have been frozen for more than ten years, in the refrigerator of President Abbas's expected death, so that the most likely scenario is that he will be succeeded by one of the boys of the occupation's civil administration, in an expected political system that is more helpless than its predecessor and no less bad...!!

On the Arab and regional level, the Arab regime was becoming increasingly hostile to the resistance, and the resistance was losing areas of influence and official or popular support in Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, while the regimes were rushing towards impudent normalization.

The most dangerous thing is that the Palestinian cause has become a target in the collective consciousness of the peoples, and targeted, systematic, and escalating attacks have begun to attack the cause, and consider it a Palestinian cause for the Palestinians. It does not appear that this trend is in a state of decline, but it is clear that it was a rising trend, and there is no doubt that it was slow to grow, but the problem is that there were no brakes to stop it and no effective tools to confront it in the future, especially with the weakness of the Islamic movements and the exaggerated distortion of them after the events of the disappointing Arab Spring...!

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

It is clear that it is not hoped that a radical change will occur in the next twenty years that we can bet on, and there is nothing to indicate that we will pay a lower price if the attack were after the next 20 or 30 years, and that will be nothing but a long life wasted in the history of the people and the cause.

Balances of Power

There are those who think that accumulating more power over the next ten or twenty years is the best option, in the hope of directing a stronger and more severe blow to the occupation, which might enable us to win the knockout blow. This is a belief that is more dominated by wishful thinking than by correct, objective knowledge of the true reality of the balance of power, far from emotional charging and exaggerated display of achievements.

The gap in the balance of power between us and the occupation, for those who do not know, was never narrowing, but rather it was constantly widening in favor of the occupation, simply because the scientific, technological, artistic, and economic resources were very abundant in favor of the occupation, and we are not saying that they were scarce for the resistance, but in fact they were very close to zero...! The resistance was literally doing the impossible and achieving great accomplishments that were almost out of nothing, and this is a source of pride and honor, and even a miracle, but the final result is that the gap is widening, and time was not working in our favor at all.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

When the resistance reached the manufacture of powerful and effective rockets during 20 years of development, the enemy was advancing faster in the field of the Iron Dome. Imagine if our speed of development had brought us to these rockets before the enemy reached this level of ability to confront this Dome?!! While we were trying to escape through large bursts to mislead the [Iron] Dome and raise its material cost, the occupation had begun to develop the laser system, which we do not know how much it needs to complete to have a trivial air defense system, capable of confronting the resistance rockets effectively, as it will be able to deploy its batteries many times more than the Iron Dome system. Then the question will be: What if the circumstances allowed for the use of our rockets before the development of this system and not after it..?!!

We used to require years to develop a capability in air or sea, while the enemy can develop defenses that limit its impact in a year or two, and the same applies to all fields, especially the field of intelligence, eavesdropping, and the ability to uncover the secrets of the resistance and the locations of its capabilities, including tunnels.

The rockets possessed by the resistance could have suddenly become worthless if a technological breakthrough occurred that would enable the enemy to scan the surface layers of the earth and identify their locations. There was much data indicating the enemy's efforts in this area.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

The same applies if there is a technological breakthrough in detecting tunnels, communications systems, or other systems and capabilities that the resistance has been developing for many years with very, very limited resources, while the enemy confronts it with an arsenal of technology and resources that are available in an unlimited manner.

The legendary crossing plan that took place on October 7 could have become worthless if an engineering, industrial, or water barrier had been added to the border system with the Strip, as a result of a security loophole from which the enemy understood or deduced the broad outlines of the attack.

The success of a very small quadcopter in planting a very precise eavesdropping device in a sensitive location, intentionally or by chance, could blow up the balance of power. Anyone who knows the daily, exhausting intelligence war between the resistance and its enemy knows how many secret projects have been exposed, and also knows how admirable the miracle is that many of them remain secret.

The experience of the Lebanese front, and what surprised Hezbollah with the infiltration of pagers and wireless devices, and the places where political and field leaders were secured, is an example of the ability of any security breach or technological progress to reposition the balance of power in favor of the enemy while increasing the gap even more.

The final and overall result of the power race within the framework of time is that time never worked in our favor and time did not give the resistance any comfort to postpone the clash.

Minimizing The Attack

The official narrative presented by the resistance is that it did not expect the attack to succeed on this scale, and that the goal was much less than what was achieved, and that the resistance's surprise at the collapse of the Gaza Division with such ease was no less than the occupation's surprise at the attack.

However, what if the attack was limited to several military sites, with limited success in abducting 10-20 soldiers, or even an attack on one military site to abduct only 3 soldiers...?

In the strategic dimension, what will change in the essence of the conflict then? A new small battle that Gaza pays the price for fiercely, consuming a large part of its weapons and equipment that need years to be restored due to the tripartite siege by the occupation, Egypt, and the [Palestinian] Authority, then Gaza returns to the same point it ended at in the rounds of 2008, 2012, 2014, and 2021, with a further tightening of the siege and a greater crisis in the resistance project, and remaining in the outcome of "stay where you are."

Then what guarantees the enemy's reaction in the first place? Who other than the enemy has the right to classify the attack as small or large? What is the guarantee that prevents the enemy, if we minimize the attack, from carrying out a large-scale aggression as happened exactly and completely, under the pretext of removing Hamas from power and recovering the three abducted soldiers or even one soldier, then rallying behind them all the conspiring forces that rallied behind them in the 2006 Lebanon War and then rallied behind them after October 7th?

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

Hezbollah's attack on Lebanon in 2006 was classified as minor, and the enemy's response was a fierce war on southern Lebanon with international support. Things could have been worse had its forces not failed miserably to achieve victory on the ground, the terrain of which served the party, given the occupation's lack of readiness for such a battle. Even Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, may Allah have mercy on him, announced that he did not expect the enemy's response to be this large and this cruel.

Almost all of the Zionist training in the recent period has been for urban warfare, and whether the expected battle was initiated by the enemy or a reaction from it, the indicators suggest that the intention to bring about a radical change in the reality of the resistance in Gaza was present and strong.

Then all the intelligence indicators of the resistance, and the indicators of the enemy's media and political escalation, suggested a sudden, large, and harsh strike coming, in which the enemy's planes would target all the senior leadership of the resistance, all the way to the executive leadership in some influential files. The previous strike on the leaders of the Al-Quds Brigades was a very small model of what was awaiting the Al-Qassam Brigades, the spearhead of the resistance in Gaza.

Then the resistance will be forced to fight back, in which the enemy will have won with its first shot. Then the enemy may deal with the resistance's response as a justification for launching a broad attack on Gaza, and we will pay the same price that was paid after the October 7 Battle, but without having the negotiating power that we had acquired as a result of the attack.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

The strongest pressure card we have today, and the main gain that gives us the margin of presence at the negotiating table, is the large number of captives in the hands of the resistance, which is a result of the size of the major attack on October 7, which some think that reducing it might give us a better position...!

Imagine the battle today, if the resistance did not have this number of captives, who represent the strongest pressure factor in the effects of the enemy's internal politics. You will not find anyone in the enemy's political ranks who disagrees with the principle of war or complains about its cost. Rather, the internal political disagreement and contradiction among the enemy revolves around the enemy's captives held by the resistance, and the necessity of their return.

The most regrettable thing in this case is not that the attack was large, but that the attack was not large enough to capture 3,500 captives instead of the number of captives which was approximately 250-350 captives. The resistance cannot be blamed for that, except as a kind of wisdom in retrospect, because the resistance actually, and in its best ambitions, did not expect its attack to succeed on 10% of the sites it attacked, and planning a successful attack that would lead to the capture of 3,000 captives was not reasonable at the time, before the facts on the ground in the flood showed the fragility of this enemy in the face of the might of the Palestinian fighter.

Minimizing the attack would have made no difference except for the loss of our most important bargaining chip with the enemy to stop the aggression.

The Pretext For Brutality

It is a mistake to think that the plan for a comprehensive attack on the Gaza Strip is a reaction to the events of October 7. Political matters in our conflict with the occupation are not proceeding in this direction at all.

The occupation deals strategically according to the logic of cost and threat, and its plans to occupy the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, or even a ground war with Egypt, Jordan, or Syria, are ready and are developed annually. The essence of the matter is when it will use this plan and add the latest improvements to it for implementation.

Plans for a ground attack on Gaza were ready, but they were locked in drawers, because the cost of the attack did not match the size of the threat. When the threat from Gaza rose above the cost, the plan came to light, final improvements were hastily made, and then implementation took place.

Whether the [October] 7th attack happened or not, the occupation's plan for the attack was ready, and whether Gaza turned from a state of disturbance to a state of threat, in October 2023 or December 2050, the plan will also be ready and proportionate to what the resistance is preparing with differences in the balance of power, perhaps in our favor and perhaps in favor of the occupation.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

More importantly, and what we must be absolutely certain of, is that the enemy was not avoiding the battle with Gaza but rather postponing it, searching for an appropriate time when it would possess a decisive security or technological superiority that would reduce the cost of attack and reoccupation. But suddenly it found itself in the heart of the battle, and the resistance had advanced a step ahead of it, depriving it of the element of surprise, and seizing from it a tiring pressure card, represented by the large number of captives, and this in itself was a baffling blow to the occupation's strategic plan.

It may be said that it gave it at the same time a justification for the attack, and a pretext for brutality, but I am absolutely certain that this enemy does not need a justification, and that this world did not need pretexts in its support for the [Zionist] entity. If the enemy had decided to occupy Gaza as a pre-emptive strike against a potential threat, its behavior would have been similar, and it would certainly have announced that it was a temporary operation to ensure the security of the [Zionist] entity. The world has an amazing ability to understand the sons of Uncle Sam, and the model of the crushing strike of the Syrian army and the blatant violation of Syrian land following the fall of the regime is a simple and miniature model of the insolence of the occupation and its dispensation with pretexts.

The brutality used in the war was not an element of luxury, or just an act of retaliation. The brutality used was part of the attack plan prepared in advance before the brutal war. It was a condition for the success of the plan and not an investment in it. The enemy could not have reached the depth it reached, and achieved the field results it wanted to achieve, without this brutal force that terrified the people. The brutality was necessary, according to its estimates, to make the resistance lose the command and control system, by eliminating everything available to it from the leadership ranks, and emptying the field of civilians, considering them an operational obstacle that requires taking into account the prolongation of the battle and the slow movement of the forces, which makes them valuable prey that drowns them in the mud of the field.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

The brutality used in Lebanon, the complete desecration of civilians, and the total destruction of a number of villages after their inhabitants were forcibly evacuated, was not, for the enemy, a reaction to a massive attack, but merely an operational need to reduce the cost of a ground attack, just as happened in Gaza.

In conclusion, if the enemy had decided to attack Gaza as part of its strategic plans, without the October 7 event, its field behavior would have been completely identical to the behavior it adopted in this battle, and thus the October 7 attack was not the reason for this brutality on the part of the enemy nor the complete silence of the world.

We are facing an enemy that throughout its history does not need excuses but creates them. While its opponents stand like docile lambs, offering all the duties of obedience, providing all the necessary proof of their docileness, and striving to avoid their excuses to attack them, it will not hesitate to devour them or bite off some of their superfluous limbs, perhaps because it only saw in a dream a disturbing vision about the future of its seventh grandchild, and that, as you know, is a strong excuse and the world always understands it easily...!

Those who advise the resistance not to give the enemy a pretext for aggression are only ashamed to demand that it surrender.

Unfortunately, some people, out of ignorance and on purpose, like to hold the resistance responsible for the Zionist barbarity, because it is easy for cowards and those with distorted consciousness, and there are many of them, to find someone to hold responsible for their suffering without finding themselves forced to bear the cost of fighting them. Therefore, instead of fighting the enemy and achieving our revenge on them, they called for the easiest options and cursed those who resist, and this is a model found in all the revolutions of the world.

Fundamental Flaw

I do not find that the resistance had made a mistake in the attack, neither in the idea of the attack, nor in its size or timing. The only fundamental mistake that the resistance made was its assessment of the stable intelligence situation regarding the size of the enemy's reaction.

The assessment of the situation was centered around the expectation of a violent reaction similar to the 2014 battle, with a broader ground invasion, but in the overall outcome it remains limited, without reaching the depths of the densely populated residential areas, "vital areas," as it was not in the imagination that the enemy would receive such international cover and regional disregard for this horrific, illogical, and unprecedented scale of the brutal use of force against civilians.

In my opinion, this flaw is the fundamental reason explaining all the policies before and after the October 7 attack, because the resistance's assessment of the enemy's reaction is the basis for the attack plan, and more importantly the defense plan, as well as the plan to deal with the home front.

Some people think that correctly assessing the enemy's reaction means that the resistance will not launch its attack, or that it will be small and limited. This is in fact a recipe for repeating the repeated and trying the tried, or it is in essence a recipe for capitulation disguised as a mask of wise insight, because as long as you resist, nothing in the whole world can guarantee the level of the enemy's reaction, because in reality the enemy's reaction is always proportionate to what he wants, not to what we have done, and Palestinian history is a renewed witness.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

Therefore, when talking about this flaw, I do not mean not carrying out the [October] 7th attack based on a sound expectation of the enemy's reaction, but rather setting the defensive and offensive plans based on a sound assessment of the situation, which means a change in the style and structure of defense, as well as a change in some details related to attack. I do not mean at all reducing the size of the attack or reducing its objectives.

The defense and combat support fire management were designed based on the assessment of the situation, which dictates that the battle time is short, the enemy is not prepared to pay the price of occupying the region at the present time, and the enemy is not able to use what we have seen of excessive force with international cover and support, which would enable it to break the defensive lines and reach the vital areas, the "hearts" of the cities, under this inferno of unprecedented bombing and bloody killing.

If the enemy's reaction had been fully calculated, the size of the tunnels and combat nodes in the vital areas, the "hearts" of the "cities", would have been ten times what they were, the attack would have taken into account a very large number of captives, the combat fire support weapons, including rockets and artillery, would have been rationed in proportion to the length of the battle, engineering and explosive equipment would have been created in proportion to the size of the enemy's attack, and a sufficient reserve of various types of equipment would have been prepared for the battle of attrition and expulsion.

Retrospective Wisdom:

Fairness requires that we not place too much blame on the resistance regarding its assessment of the enemy's reaction, first because the narrow circle of decision-making in such an attack deprives the decision-maker of the breadth of thought and diversity of opinions, and an attack with this tactic cannot succeed with the expansion of the circle of its makers.

Secondly, because the overwhelming majority of analysts, politicians, and even leaders of political action, especially the geniuses among them, did not expect even on October 10th the extent of the enemy's reaction today, and I say October 10th, that is, after the extent of the attack by the resistance became clear, and samples of the enemy's reactions became clear, so how can we ask to place the utmost blame on someone who did not expect the enemy's reaction in the way we saw, while they are planning an attack whose results will be much less than this success that we saw?

I am certain that a rare few, not exceeding the fingers of one hand, expected the extent of the enemy's reaction, based on a conscious assessment of the political and field situation on the part of the world, the region, the enemy, and the ally. As for those whose assessment of the situation is governed by innate cowardice or psychological hatred, it is very natural for them to expect the extent of the reaction that even the enemy has not thought of until now...!!

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

All of this talk is just retrospective wisdom, after we saw with our own eyes what our analytical mind did not see before what happened happened, and we do not dare to claim that we are more aware and wise than those who wrote this heroic epic that will be recorded in human history as one of the best, creative, and professional military plans throughout ancient and contemporary history.

Legitimate Reproach

If there is anything for which we can rightly blame the leadership of the resistance, it is the lack of a mature plan to manage the internal front, while acknowledging that a large part of the failure is based on previous failure related to assessing the enemy's reaction, and despite our knowledge of the existence of a ready plan for a state of emergency and our realization that the battle was beyond expectations, I think it could have been better than it was, but at the same time we find many who are biased on this point more than necessary, and that a war of this cruelty and a brutal, comprehensive targeting of all components of the movement and government work was enough to bring down stable countries and regimes with huge resources.

It is unimaginably difficult for all decision-making layers to be in a position of brutal targeting, and for the means of the lower leaderships, which have become burdened with the follow-up - to interpret the reality and thus change it, through correspondents and some of those around them, and even this primitive means is often a reason for targeting these civilian leaderships by the enemy, even though they are at the bottom of the leadership pyramid.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

Here I cannot respect any process of comprehensive criticism or blame, or even criticism at specific points without presenting a mature alternative, with my certainty that many of the alternatives that we think are mature, when implemented, lead to other problems that were solved by the previous alternatives. Nevertheless, I find room for reproach in this regard, especially that honest and careful reproach, and I do not want to go into details at this time.

The Price Paid: "Who's Responsible?"

Many people like to hold the resistance responsible for the enemy's absolute hand in its insane crimes against the people besieged from all sides in the Gaza Strip, as if there is any act in the world that can justify this blatant brutality committed in front of the world without any movement.

Every occupation in the world throughout history, in its brutal suppression of revolutions, has observed two broad lines that govern its actions and curb its brutality, so that the crisis of affairs does not get out of hand, and its brutality becomes a cause of its own destruction rather than of the suppression of the revolution that opposes it.

The first is that it creates a difference, even if only formal, between the oppressed people (the good guys) and the handful of revolutionaries and their aides (the bad guys), then it directs its brutality at what it considers the revolutionaries, in order to create distortion, deception, and awareness that gives it the opportunity to isolate the revolutionaries while preserving the submissiveness of the remaining majority, since it is natural in all revolutions that the revolutionaries are a minority in themselves, even if they represent the conscience of the majority.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

The second is that if it uses excessive force and violence, it does not exceed the limit that the oppressed cannot bear, and thus it faces a comprehensive revolution without limits, and it does not use absolute force that is extremely brutal so as not to attract the alignment of the surrounding peoples, whose natural human nature responds to helping their neighbors, or defends itself if it remains silent from what has befallen them being extended to them.

You stand stunned and astonished, not in front of the brutality of the occupation that exceeds all limits of human reason, nor in front of its launching of a fierce battle in which it opens its fire on all people without distinction or discrimination, so that neither the elderly nor the newborn child are safe from it, and every day it commits a series of massacres that history would have stopped at the occurrence of such things every two decades in different and vast regions.

You are truly astonished by the unprecedented human dullness, from the national relative before the Arab ally before the global foreigner, which had it not become rampant in decadence or conspiracy, the occupation would not have lost its logical brakes, and would not have found its hand free to do evil to our people, and to make the price paid double without accountability or consequences.

In fact, the one who bears responsibility for this insane price is not the one who did their natural duty in resisting an enemy that imprisons thousands of Palestinians in inhumane conditions for very long years without any hope of freedom, an enemy that nibbles at the land, violates sovereignty, increases settlements, violates Al-Quds, targets Al-Aqsa, and imposes new facts every day without restraint or deterrent.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

Rather, the one who bears responsibility for this enormous price is the one who did not perform their natural, even instinctive, role in curbing the machine of oppression and creating tools of influence on the enemy, and there are many of them, forcing them to control their reactions and preventing them from taking absolute control of people's lives and suffering.

How does all this happen in Gaza, while the vast settlements of the West Bank remain safe and secure, and are a stone's throw away from every village and city in the West Bank, which is no less miserable in terms of occupation than its sister, how is it that the Palestinian in Gaza is literally slaughtered and their blood runs in the valleys of the streets, while the other Palestinian lives their life completely normally, and they have almost every minute the opportunity to clash at zero distance with an occupation patrol, a security checkpoint, a checkpoint, or a settlement gate.

We are not talking about attacking the occupied interior, God forbid. We are talking about the settlements within the 1967 borders, which all the laws of the world have guaranteed a legitimate right to resist. The Palestinian in the West Bank has a forest of rifles that, if they moved, could at least curb the enemy's madness, if they could not stop it.

Let us abandon the armed and violent struggle "God forbid", where are the sweeping popular marches, which appear in Madrid, Spain, to be many times more than the timid crowds in Ramallah, Palestine... Where are the effective and influential means of non-violent struggle?!! Where is the reaction within its less than worldly limits?!! Where... a thousand wheres and wheres.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

The resistance bears the natural price of resisting the occupation, and it is a price we pay with pride, honor, and dignity. As for the insane price without restraints, it is borne entirely by everyone who was in a position of failure and negligence, not by those who offered their blood, their best men, and their children in defense of their people and the thawabets (principles) of their cause.

In the battle to distort national awareness, those who have neglected are launching a fierce media attack with extreme impudence, to hold the resistance responsible for the painful price, which would not have been so painful, had the inaction not been so dull...!

You are astonished to the point of astonishment that all the surrounding regimes, which play a clear conspiratorial role no matter how much they dress themselves in the clothes of solidarity, have received a generous share of flattery, praise and solidarity from the group of inaction, both old and new.

A Missing Question

The most common question is what if the resistance had not launched its large-scale attack on October 7, while they deliberately and knowingly ignore the essential and most important question, which is what if everyone had done their part perfectly, just as the resistance did its part perfectly?

What if the West Bank rose up in full force, and used all available means, popular or military, to revolt against the occupation, which was humiliating and insulting it many times more than what was inflicted on Gaza, and the number of settlers affected by the battle increased, pressuring their government and demanding the lost security, to be a pressure card and a brake on the enemy's madness and unlimited brutality?

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

What if the official Palestinian regime [Fatah] exploited this event to ignite a political and diplomatic revolution in all forums of the world, clarifying the oppression of the Palestinian people and returning the cause to its essence as a national liberation project and a usurped Palestinian right, and linking Zionist security to the Palestinian right, not in order to defend Gaza, but in order to strengthen its negotiating cards, and protect the walls of its district from being urinated on by the occupation soldiers if they find them surrounded...!

What if our sole legitimate representative led a relentless shuttle movement to the Arab and Western capitals, to form an effective international coalition, preventing the enemy from isolating Gaza, or brutalizing it without accountability, or at least imposing the entry of the necessary aid to sustain life? If it does not do that in these circumstances, what are the appropriate circumstances for it to do anything...!

What if the overwhelming torrent of Palestinian Foreign Ministry employees, who are allocated a budget of salaries with astronomical figures, were to spend day and night exposing the crimes and violations of the occupation and inciting world opinion against these brutal atrocities?

What if a portion of the Palestinians inside "Israel" played a tenth of the role assigned to them in such a pivotal battle, raising the cost of aggression and depriving the enemy of the euphoria of security from close by, after Gaza was no longer able to apply rocket pressure from afar?

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

What if the Palestinian community in the surrounding countries marched roarily towards the borders, no matter how much the clash cost them in terms of heavy prices, painful bruises, and deep wounds? How could they have thought the price to be too great, while the blood of the Gazans flows in rivers in every street and alley?

What if the Palestinians of the diaspora played their proper role, and continued day and night, holding sit-ins by the thousands in the capitals of Western countries, exposing the crimes and atrocities of the occupation around the clock and every moment?

These essential and deserved questions are meant to disappear behind the most unjust and easiest question, what if Gaza had not done so? They do not answer the question that concerns them, what if they had done so...?!

Perhaps the resistance was wrong in betting on some other Palestinian parties to play their required role, but what is certain and definitive is that the parties that did not play their role are not wrong, but criminals... criminals against themselves before they are criminals against the cause and the afflicted region, and there is a vast and big difference between the one who is wrong and the criminal.

The Right Question:

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

There is no doubt that the price paid so far is a great, expensive, and costly price: the precious blood that was shed, the homes that were demolished, the infrastructure that was destroyed, and the children of the cause and its heroes who dismounted (martyred). But whoever carries a real liberation project, not just wishful dreams or beautiful fantasies, will find that all of these prices are necessary and deserved prices for the sake of our liberation project. Every conscious person realizes that the liberation of Palestine in particular, which is the center of global conflict, will not be easy or simple, and that the price of the freedom of our cause, by virtue of its reality, context, and the nature of its occupation, which is a replacement and not a colonial one, will be multiples of any of the prices of the liberation experiences in the modern century, and in the course of this cause. Only great sacrifices will reveal the secrets of souls and answer the hidden thoughts of consciences. Do we really want to liberate Palestine or are we only wishing? Because whoever is true to their will, will not be startled by the cost... And not everyone who awaits Saladin will not, upon his arrival, be anticipating peace with the Franks (Crusaders), content with safety as spoils and considering the price before conquest as defeat...!

We, as Palestinians, have been asking the wrong question throughout the life of our cause. We were asking: Do we really want to liberate Palestine? It was an empty question, a question that was extremely easy but extremely deceptive. The right question should have been: Are we really ready to pay the price...?

What we have seen and are still seeing at the moment is part of the price that we do not know how much it will reach now or how much it will be in the future. Although we are divided in many opinions, we are still only two groups, a group that wants freedom and is ready to pay the price, and a group that is immersed in wishes. Some will think that I am talking about our political division, but the truth is that I am talking about our fundamental division, which for those who do not know, is a division that crosses all our national parties of different colors. All our parties contain both groups to varying degrees. We are not divided into Hamas, Fatah, and other factions. We are all divided into those who want to be liberated and those who only wish for it...!

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

Every talk about the next stage or intellectual and political theorizing about the reality or the future should start from the same question. I personally have reserved my role in advance with those who want to liberate their homeland and I have prepared myself to find that the price paid so far is still a small price. There are many who are surprised by the description of its asceticism, but those whom Allah will honor by seeing their homeland free will discover that it is even more ascetic.

Have We Won?

Our battle with the occupation is still ongoing, and will continue. No revolution in the world has ever been won by a knockout blow. Revolutions win by accumulation and continuity. The knockout blow belongs to the great powers, not to the weak. However, victory does not necessarily belong to those who have a long history of power, but rather to those who have greater endurance and the ability to rise after every strong blow that the opponent thinks is a knockout blow.

In the general pattern of revolutions and liberation experiences, the revolution does not triumph simply by deciding to fight. Many liberation experiences have gone through waves of expensive wars of independence that were shattered by the brutality of the occupiers, but in the end they tried again, and tried once, twice, and 23 times, until the occupier found themselves exhausted. The truth is that the revolutionary peoples are more tired, exhausted, poor, and in pain, but only hope, adherence to the right, and knowledge of the value of freedom are what make them continue on the path and not stop at half a revolution or half a solution.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

Most of the battles between revolutionaries and occupiers do not end in victory or defeat, except in two cases and no third, that is, the occupation is removed or the revolution capitulates. As for the numerous debates and battles between them, they do not end in victory for the revolutionaries or defeat for the enemies or the opposite, no matter how the results are in favor of the revolutionaries or the occupiers. The debates end with the revolution not being victorious, but not being defeated, and this is a sufficient enough description...!

In all our previous battles with the enemy, we did not win, but this description is not the important part of the evaluation. The most important and essential part is that we were not defeated, and this battle is part of a series of debates with the enemy. We certainly did not win, but we alone will decide whether we will be defeated.

The human and material losses can be tolerated, as all liberation projects have tolerated throughout history, but the only real and unbearable loss is to receive all this painful blow and then not rise again to fight...!

All the waves of the Syrian Revolution did not win, and were exposed to severe and strong blows, but they were not defeated. In 2018, everyone began to talk about the Syrian Revolution as an adventure that was not calculated, a revolutionary recklessness that led to the destruction and fragmentation of Syria, a catastrophic act with catastrophic results. In truth, nothing could have been more catastrophic, except the revolution's conviction and its decision to [declare] defeat. Victory is an act that you may or may not be able to do, but defeat is nothing but a decision.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

You can imagine the value of the sacrifices, the pain, the pieces of flesh scattered under the explosive barrels, the breaths burned by sarin, the corpses swaying on the gallows, or those forced to dig their own graves before being buried alive, if the revolution had had enough of paying the price, and then did not rise again.

When revolutions are immersed in the dawn of their victory, they find themselves in the bliss of those who have never been touched by misery, and sacrifices are no longer mixed with regret but rather adorned with pride. Ask the Syrian Revolution, whose men are entering the squares of Damascus at the time of writing these lines, and you will discover the meaning.

In this pivotal battle in the history of our Palestinian people and their cause, it is a very naive luxury for one to ask about victory or defeat, while the only duty is for one to ask about his role in not being defeated, and then the enemy will not have won.

In true and honest liberation projects, every strike against the occupation is a step on the road to victory, every price paid is fuel to continue the battle, a motive for the revenge of generations, and the accumulation of their national reserves. But in domesticated revolutions and seasoned mercenary liberation movements, as they like to consider themselves, every strike against the enemy is reckless and uncalculated, and every price paid is an opportunity to reinforce and spread the philosophy of defeat, and then treason becomes a national project and not even a point of view...!

Chapter Two:

The Implications of The Flood

Strategic War Plan: "Zeroing Out The Dangers"

According to the maneuvers and training of the enemy army before the Al-Aqsa Flood Battle, it is likely that the strategic plan of the occupying state is to wage a simultaneous war on multiple fronts, in which it possesses the element of surprise and initiative, where it begins - when the conditions are ready - with a decisive strike on Iran, followed immediately or simultaneously by a strike on Gaza and Hezbollah. While the conditions were available for a strike on Gaza and Lebanon, it was not yet ripe to deal with the Iranian threat, because it can deal with Gaza and Lebanon alone, while its capabilities do not enable it to deal with the Iranian threat alone, but rather it needs to involve an international coalition headed by America to launch the attack, which is what the enemy was seeking before the war.

The October 7 attack deprived the enemy of the advantage of the first strike, and also deprived them of entering the battle at the appropriate time with their military readiness to achieve the strategic objectives on the three fronts in a manner consistent with the weight of declaring a state of war, which prompted the Zionist enemy to accelerate its strategic plans that it had been postponing and cooking on a low flame. Since the war had become reality, it sought through it to achieve the greatest possible accomplishment, as war cannot be declared every day or even every few years, and the enemy state did not accept entering into another war the size of the Gaza war or more after two, three, or even ten years, and therefore it took into account that as long as it entered into a war, its achievement must be at the level of a war and not at the level of a major military operation, and the difference between war and a military operation is like the difference between the 1967 War and the Operation Protective Edge Battle in the summer of 2014.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

The enemy's plan was based on zeroing out the strategic dangers (Gaza - Lebanon - Iran) to the [Zionist] entity state, to secure its survival for several decades to come. We are not talking here about a reaction, but about pre-planned plans and old intentions, accompanied by intelligence efforts that have not stopped for years on all fronts, not just on the Gaza Strip front.

While the vast majority thought it was a war of retaliation on Gaza, aimed at restoring honor and pressuring to free the captives, the truth is that this was not the enemy's intention at all, but rather a strategic battle through which the enemy wanted to tip the balance of power in the entire region in favor of the occupation. The occupation's intention was indeed to completely and finally eliminate the resistance in Gaza and Lebanon, while directing a decisive strategic blow to Iran, and thus eliminating the dangers to the [Zionist] entity's state for many years. The last of the enemy's concerns was the captives' file, but without a doubt it was and still is a pressure factor and a strong bargaining chip in the hands of the resistance.

The enemy forces were dealing with Gaza and at the same time re-examining their pre-prepared plan in Lebanon, and adding final improvements to it. Whoever thought that the attack on Lebanon was due to the support battle led by Hezbollah is mistaken. The enemy knows that the Party's ability to carry out an attack similar to October 7 is greater than the ability and capabilities of besieged Gaza. The settlers in the north would not accept staying in the north while they were under a double threat from what they saw in the Gaza envelope. They knew that cutting off the Jalil Finger would be easier for the Party than Gaza's ability to attack the envelope. The enemy, as we mentioned, will not wage a war with Gaza today but will wage a war with Lebanon in years. The enemy wants to end the state of fear for the survival of its entity, which is foreign to a region that is completely rejecting it.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

The enemy was deliberately provoking Lebanon and dragging it into battle, and the resistance in Lebanon was insisting on not breaking the rules of engagement. Despite all its attempts to balance between remaining a support front without entering into a comprehensive war, Hezbollah found itself in a state of war imposed on it by the enemy, which did not leave it room to retreat. Whether the Party entered into a support battle or not, the enemy would in any case impose the battle on it to secure its entity from the danger of the north.

Even Iran, which was practicing a policy of strategic patience, the enemy tried to provoke it and drag it into battle, until the peak of provocation was reached in the assassination of the martyr Ismail Haniyeh, may Allah have mercy on him, in the heart of Tehran. They made every effort to obtain American support in directing the required strike against Iran after its missile response to them, but the American calculations did not go according to the Zionist desires, even though it granted it some strategic compensation in return.

It is important to note that if the battle began in Lebanon or even Iran, it would certainly reach Gaza with the same strategic goal - minimizing the dangers, and thus with the same cruelty and criminality.

Strategic Failure and Tactical Successes

Any assessment of the results of the battle should not be made by measuring the subsequent situation with the previous situation, but rather by the enemy state's ability or inability to achieve the strategic war goal of eliminating the three dangers, because even though this war was the first strike against the resistance, it was a pre-emptive move for the same war with the same goals that the enemy state was planning before the [Al-Aqsa] Flood.

Gaza has received the largest and harshest share of the Zionist attack, firstly because it is a closed area in the enemy's inner flank and is already under Zionist sovereignty and is not an independent state like Lebanon, and secondly because of its small geographical area and weak military capabilities as a result of the siege, the weakness of its flat terrain and its lack of natural barriers that can be harnessed in defense. There is no doubt that Gaza has received painful, hurtful, and influential blows to its human and military capabilities, its resistance infrastructure and its strategic weapons.

However, the enemy knows that, up until this moment, it is still very, very far from achieving its goal of finally eliminating the resistance and eliminating its future danger. If the enemy is harmed by the situation of the West Bank, which we see as being in its worst national condition, then there are very long years of fighting between the enemy and turning Gaza into another West Bank.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

America occupied Iraq with a tenth of the firepower used against Gaza, and was able to exercise direct rule over the Iraqi people, spread out in the cities and provinces, and lead the civil administrations in the country. However, until now, after more than a year of unprecedented bombing, killing, and genocide, not a single Zionist tank can be present in a civilian area, even on the outskirts, without using preliminary bombardment and excessive firepower as a cover for entry and then immediate and rapid withdrawal. Until this moment, the enemy is absolutely unable in the short term to directly administer Gaza's security, and no other local or regional forces can administer Gaza's security without the resistance's permission and will.

If the enemy's goal was to weaken Gaza, then there is no doubt that it has achieved something great. However, if the occupation's goal was to end the resistance in Gaza and reduce its danger to zero with what it calls absolute victory, then until now its achievement has not gone beyond being absolute zero.

On the Lebanese front, the enemy had drawn up its plan based on sensitive, extensive, and accurate information. The enemy thought that it was almost comprehensive and sufficient to completely throw the Party off balance on the ground and extinguish its missile fire capabilities, enabling it to cross as far as the Litani River and impose military facts on the ground that would enable it to dismantle Hezbollah's capabilities and infrastructure in the south, similar to what happened in Gaza.

Hence the targeting of the pager and wireless devices, which were expected to eliminate the entire field leadership from the bottom of the pyramid to the top, then the precise and focused targeting of the command and control system, and the elimination of most of the Party's senior field leadership, then the extensive and intensive strikes on a large bank of missile targets through which it was thought that it had deprived the Party of its ability to direct effective fire at the depth of the Zionist [entity].

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

When implementing and investing these attacks to achieve a smooth ground entry at the lowest possible cost, the enemy was surprised by the Party's defensive capabilities, which the terrain increased its effectiveness, and was surprised by the size of the field losses on the first southern borders, and was even more surprised by the Party's ability to transfer the battle with missile power to the depth of the Zionist [entity], which represented an intelligence failure that contradicted the enemy's expectations, and forced the enemy to fight a faltering ground battle under missile pressure. The strange thing is that until the last moments, the Party was committed to striking military targets and had not yet entered the stage of extensive pressure on civilians. It seems that the Party managed its military resources in a regulated manner that would enable it to continue the combat momentum for months and perhaps years.

The enemy also succeeded a little in weakening Hezbollah, but it did not come close at all to achieving its goal of ending the threat of the Party, especially with the Party's ability to restore its capacity with a supply line that was open at the time of signing the ceasefire agreement with Hezbollah, but it achieved tactical success by separating the northern front from the southern one.

Even after cutting off the Party's supply line through Syria, the Party still poses a fundamental threat to the [Zionist] entity, and all the enemy has achieved is postponing the battle and delaying the danger, not eliminating it.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

As for the Iranian front, the enemy has so far failed to muster the appropriate international coalition to deliver a decisive blow to Iran, while Iran still poses a central threat to the Zionist enemy. Although it has suffered a political blow and lost the Syrian field, it is still proceeding with its nuclear project and is influential in a number of regional fields. The possibility of forging a new relationship with the new regime in Syria is not impossible or unlikely, even after a while.

In a general conclusion, the enemy achieved tactical success, but it was unable to achieve any of the major strategic goals for which it launched this fierce and devastating war. The enemy state is still surrounded by enemies and will not enjoy stability and calm during the following years.

The Syrian Surprise

What happened in Syria later was the biggest blow to Hezbollah, and the success of the revolution in toppling the regime was not the result of a Zionist or American plan. If there was a plan, it was probably to occupy the Party and Iran in a new battle inside Syria, according to intelligence information about the attacks planned by the Syrian opposition with Turkish support. The opposition did not even expect that it would succeed in entering the Syrian capital, Damascus.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

But the sudden collapse of the regime and the entry of the revolutionaries into Damascus exceeded all expectations, and baffled all friendly and hostile parties alike, which prompted the enemy to launch comprehensive pre-emptive attacks on Syrian military capabilities after the fall of the regime, because it did not know the intentions of the new regime and did not think that it would transform Syria into a friendly environment.

The success of the Syrian Revolution was one of the strangest contradictory emotional experiences we have gone through as a Palestinian resistance. We were happy with the success of the revolution and the victory of the Syrian oppressed [people] over the bloody regime that the resistance had been forced to make [allies with] in recent years, as a result of the Arab and Sunni betrayal of the cold attempts to open a new page with it, after the split that occurred as a result of Hamas's bias towards the revolution at its beginning. At the same time, it was a sad and worrying feeling that the Axis of Resistance received this painful blow that severed its geographical connection and complicated its supply lines at the moment when we were most in need of increasing the danger to the enemy, not decreasing it.

However, what happened in Syria is against our interests in the short tactical term, but in my opinion, it will turn to our advantage in the long strategic term. The revolutionary regime and its forces that overthrew the regime have a similar intellectual and ideological background to the resistance in Gaza, and share with us their hostility to the Zionist enemy. What will pose the greatest threat to the [Zionist] entity is the existence of a Sunni entity that supports the resistance and is not opposed to it. Syria will, in the future, be the first Sunni regime in the surrounding countries to stand in hostility to the Zionist entity. I have always said and still say that the real danger to the enemy is not the Iranian project, but the awakening of the Sunni project.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

These are wishes that will encounter many obstacles and huge challenges on the way to achieving them, and America and the [Zionist] entity will try to insert their fingers to subjugate the new regime. All I hope for is that the Syrian Revolution will be at a level of awareness that transcends sectarianism, and that Iran will be able to swallow its tactical defeat in Syria and weave a new relationship that transcends the sectarian dimension, and free itself from its ideological complex and correct its historical mistake in supporting the criminal Syrian regime against the Syrian Revolution instead of helping the regime to carry out political reforms that preserve it and perpetuate its alliance with Syria, people and regime, after the alliance was at the regime level. Hamas may be the most prominent candidate to play the mediating role to bring the viewpoints of the Sunni and Shiite axis in the region closer together.

The Occupation's Plan Towards Gaza: "A Bit of Detail"

The enemy deals with Gaza as a special case, as a private matter of the occupation and not a state or an independent entity, and also as a source of chronic disturbance and continuous disruption of all the occupation's desires for calm, stability, and integration into the region and the living part of the Palestinian cause whose immune system is still active and not surrendering to imposing facts on the ground aimed at liquidating the Palestinian cause and the capitulation of its people.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

The enemy's plan from the beginning was aimed at displacing the Gazans willingly or unwillingly. At the beginning of the war, they tried to persuade Egypt to accept receiving the Gazan refugees temporarily. Temporary in the occupation's dictionary is very similar to the word permanent. The Egyptian regime rejected this proposal, not out of love for us, but out of fear of us, I believe. The enemy found itself forced to deal with the existence of a humanitarian zone in the south, not in the Sinai. There is no doubt that the enemy was very shocked by the legendary steadfastness of Gaza, and up until this moment, the honorable and blessed people of Gaza and the north have foiled the most dangerous Zionist plan against the Strip and nipped the displacement project in the bud. They paid a very high price for that, may Allah be pleased with them all. The plan is still ongoing and the steadfastness is still more than legendary.

Their operational plan was based on breaking the resistance's solid defenses by dismantling the tunnel structure through destruction and severing connections, while isolating the geographical areas they entered from supply, communication, and contact lines, which facilitated crossing operations into the depths at a lower cost and with a protected back. They used the bulldozed land policy to destroy the rocket structure, as they expanded immensely in the land bulldozing process until it covered most of the geographical area of the region in the literal sense and without exaggeration.

Yes, the strikes were harsh, painful, and sometimes devastating and influential, but with all this fierce war, scorched earth [policies], and multiple military divisions that were assigned to dismantle Gaza's defenses and were previously assigned to occupy countries, the enemy was shocked by the resistance's ability to survive and renew itself, and its inability so far to gain direct or indirect field control over even a small village in the Strip. And every time it enters an area, it still deals with it as if it is entering it for the first time, while it fights it more than it fought it the first time.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

The resistance was able to combine maintaining the organizational hierarchy with operational flexibility, and was not greatly affected by the loss of field leaders, regardless of their position at the bottom or top of the hierarchy. The ambushes are still operating effectively and transmitting news and images from the field to the media without delay or hesitation.

Most of the rocket platforms that were destroyed had been launched in advance, as the resistance began with a high intensity of fire based on an assessment of the situation that the battle was expected to be short. The resistance was also launching the largest number of rounds available under the threat of ground [invasion] before the [occupation] vehicles reached it. However, the resistance still announces from time to time its ability to target "Tel Aviv," and reminds the depth of the [Zionist] entity that Gaza is still present and has its nails. It seems that there is a systematic policy to ration the rocket bombardment, due to the longer duration of the battle than expected, and the lack of supply lines under control of the battle. As for the envelope, it seems from the intermittent firing that its share of the stockpile is more abundant.

As for their political plan, it was and still is to eliminate the security control of the resistance in Gaza, and dismantle its ruling system, without handing over power to the [Palestinian] Authority, but rather to tribal and clan entities or armed gangs, which take on the role of ruling in Gaza on behalf of the occupation, and thus liquidate the Strip and separate it from the Palestinian regime [Fatah]. The enemy wants to keep Gaza under security control of the occupation without getting into the administrative details so as not to bear the consequences resulting from it as an occupying force, meaning that it wants to rule Gaza without being its ruler.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

The resistance has so far thwarted all attempts to create alternative entities to manage some affairs in Gaza, such as aid and others, and has preserved, in one way or another, albeit to a limited extent, the cohesion of the internal front and the non-disintegration or disappearance of the administrative control system, despite the great risks for anyone who takes the lead in working in this field. The reality, up until now, still imposes on any political entity that could have a ruling say in the region in the future, that it be acceptable to the resistance forces and will not be, at the very least, a tool of the occupation.

As for the occupation's security plan, the enemy seeks to divide the Gaza Strip into two parts via the "Netzarim Axis," and perhaps three or more in the future to facilitate security control and weaken the resistance's ability to communicate geographically and prevent the flow of military supplies between regions. It wants to control the "Philadelphi Axis," not only to prevent smuggling, but also to deprive the Gaza Strip of any element of sovereignty, such as the shared border with another country, no matter how cooperative the Egyptian regime is with the enemy or even as one of its tools. Its plan is to maintain its freedom to intervene operationally by air or land to thwart what it sees as a security threat, which means that the state of war will not end in peace in the previous sense of aggression, but rather in an atmosphere similar to the Second Intifada in the assassination phase. For this reason, it wants to maintain a large security buffer zone along the border, and a wider area to the north, to secure the most densely populated settlement bloc in "Sderot," and for the north to be a pressure and future negotiation card that will turn over time into a painful concession that it offers to the Palestinians after the greatest amount of procrastination and corresponding costs.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

While the resistance and the people have thwarted other occupation plans, this security plan remains beyond the capabilities of the resistance at the present time, and the only strong card we have to pressure the occupation at the present time is the relatively large number of captives we have, a number that some thought was our big predicament, while in reality it was our most important card.

It is true that until now we have not succeeded in thwarting the occupation's security plan, but I never meant that we would not succeed...!

But we will not succeed unless we know what we want and are prepared to pay the price for it.

Goals of Negotiations Between the Occupation and the Resistance

The negotiation process confirms that the captives' file is the last thing that concerns the enemy government, and the enemy has used it as a means to gain time and relieve internal pressure from time to time, but through the conditions set by the enemy we can discern the general strategy that the enemy is following through the negotiations.

Through negotiations, the enemy is trying to reduce the number of captives as much as possible with the least amount of concessions, which reduces the weight of the captives' card as the only pressure factor in the hands of the resistance to thwart its security plan.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

They also seek to achieve politically through negotiations what they could not achieve on the ground through tanks, which is to exclude the resistance from influence, and to hand over the region to a party that manages it according to the whims of the occupation on behalf of it, deprives the resistance of the ability to restore its strength, and retains the right to surgical intervention to neutralize any future threat.

As for the resistance, it is primarily seeking to thwart the occupation's security plan through the pressure card it possesses represented by the captives, and thus force the enemy to withdraw from the Strip, especially the "Netzarim and Philadelphi axes," which represents the final blow to the enemy's strategic goals from the war and its failure to eliminate the danger of Gaza in the long term.

The resistance is also trying to achieve an acceptable gain in the issue of prisoners, after all these great sacrifices and the horrific war, as this war may be the last opportunity to liberate the prisoners in the coming ten years or more.

The resistance also seeks to strategically preserve the independence of the Palestinian decision in the issue of managing Gaza after the war, away from Zionist hegemony, regardless of the extent of the concessions it can make in this context.

Weaknesses Between the Occupation and the Resistance

The enemy's weak points are represented by the number of captives held by the resistance, the international pressure seeking to end the war, the [occupation] army's dissatisfaction with the length of the battle, and the heavy economic and security cost of the occupation's presence inside Gaza, along with the inability to inflict a crushing defeat on the resistance that would enable its forces to control the field or operate freely. Also, the "Netzarim and Philadelphi axes," if they remain under Zionist security control, represent high-threat contact lines, which increases their security and economic cost to the enemy.

The resistance has three main weaknesses:

First is the insanely difficult living conditions of the residents of the Strip, between the barbaric bombing and brutal killing that makes every individual in the Strip, without exception, lose their personal security, and between the comprehensive siege and systematic starvation that is practiced on the people, making the ability to live daily life a difficult and exhausting matter, and the repeated evacuations that cause enormous suffering for large segments in a single moment, in addition to the scattered ground operations from time to time, which increases the destruction of the few remaining buildings and properties that have not been destroyed.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

Second is the fierce moral war waged against the resistance, led directly and systematically by the occupation, to the point that it does not miss an opportunity to link the suffering of the people to the behavior of the resistance, and often does so intentionally. When it has field objectives in a certain area based on intelligence information or pre-prepared objectives, it requests its evacuation in a hurry under the pretext of launching rockets from it, while it enters it in a barbaric manner to achieve purely field objectives. I have not found a single case in which the enemy entered because of the rockets, as it will not throw its forces into the fire of danger to pursue every two rockets that will come out of the Strip. While the resistance launches its rockets from the farthest areas classified as "red" far from civilians, the enemy requests the evacuation of residential areas that were classified as "green". If it has a field objective, it penetrates into them, and if it does not have field objectives, it is content with terrorizing the people and costing them the hardship of evacuation and the suffering of repeated displacement. Unfortunately, there are those who are drawn in by Zionist propaganda and donate to achieving the propaganda objectives of the occupation intentionally and unintentionally.

Third is the lack of cohesion in the Palestinian national position, and the [Palestinian] Authority's presentation of itself as a moderate and available alternative that accepts concessions that the resistance does not accept to make. This position reduces the alignment of the people in Gaza around the resistance, and constitutes a pressure factor to make concessions instead of strengthening the resistance's negotiating position as a strategic national interest in the face of the occupation's liquidation plans.

Supreme National Strategic Interest

All that has happened so far is not what should concern us or be the subject of our debate. The axe has fallen on the head. Whether the October 7 attack was the cause of the events, or whether it was a pre-emptive event for an inevitable coming Zionist plan, and whether the [Al-Aqsa] Flood was a pretext for the enemy's brutality or whether it was our chance to have the first strike and to have a relatively strong card to negotiate with, none of this concerns us at the moment.

The only important thing now, and what every keen patriot should care about and be concerned with, is that the war stops in a way that does not strategically harm the Palestinian cause. This means that the conditions of the day after the battle allow the resistance to restore its strength, even if very slowly. This requires the enemy to withdraw from the Strip, and the inability of any future regime to repeat the experience of the West Bank with the resistance after 2007, or the experience of the [Palestinian] Authority in general with the resistance in the '90s of the last century. The only guarantee for this is the strength of the resistance and the awareness of the people.

The occupation's intentions towards Gaza are not related to Gaza, but rather to the Palestinian cause as a whole, the relentless pursuit to liquidate the Palestinian cause as a whole, and to remove all obstacles and impediments to the enemy's free hand in implementing its plans to liquidate Palestinian existence. It is the battle of the entire Palestinian cause taking place on the land of Gaza, and not a partial battle in Gaza.

The one who will be harmed by the weakness of Gaza or its fall, God forbid, will not be Gaza or those who lead it, but rather the entire Palestinian cause with all its pillars and thawabets (principles).

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

The West Bank will find itself alone, without support or nails, and Gaza will not be present with it, but rather a scarecrow for it. In order to avoid the fate of Gaza, the West Bank will make all concessions disguised as wisdom and flexibility. The [Zionist] entity will declare its sovereignty over the West Bank, or at least over more than 70% of its area that is not subject to the [Palestinian] Authority, and it will be subject to a systematic, forced, and voluntary displacement process. Gaza will be the area of exile for rioters and those who go against the occupation's will in the West Bank. By the way, Gaza will not only be the exile of revolutionaries, but a wide spectrum of their relatives - even those who exaggerate in their pacifism, because the real crime is not to be a resistance fighter, but to be Palestinian.

The occupation's measures to Judaize Al-Quds and change its identity will accelerate, while we will not have a single means of pressure to stop the unilateral measures in Al-Aqsa, and gradually transform it into a second Abrahamic sanctuary. The Palestinians inside will be devoured just as Gaza was once devoured before, and the refugee issue will end once and for all. As for the prisoners, their suffering will be more severe than [any kind of] description, our helplessness as Palestinians will be greater than oppression, and our shame will be heavier than one generation of ours can bear.

Therefore, what is happening in Gaza, how the war will end, and the day after it, is not a purely Gazan affair, nor is it a sacrifice that some are waiting for to fall so that they can take their share of the crumbs of its entrails that the occupation throws at them. It is the battle of all Palestinians, and we must stop the partisan childishness in the face of the imminent danger that awaits the cause as a whole, while some think that this moment is an appropriate time to settle their accounts with the resistance program, as if their program will survive if Gaza falls or is weakened.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

If there was a real national conscience, all forces would have rushed to support Gaza and bolster its position, instead of playing the role of the moderate alternative. Political, diplomatic, media, and popular efforts would have been combined to support the steadfastness of Gaza, its resistance, and its people, instead of outbidding it and targeting the morale of its people, because keeping Gaza strong and capable of influencing and rebuilding its strength is a strategic interest for all Palestinians if they truly possess a national liberation project and do not accept living in the occupation's fold, content with the privileges of pasture that are granted to them.

If some cannot support Gaza by opening an armed or even popular resistance front, and do not have the weight to support it financially and alleviate its living suffering, then at least it is required to support it morally or even to be satisfied with the virtue of silence.

Part of the goals of the excessive bloody killing force used by the occupation in Gaza is to burn awareness and make people apostate from their cause, and to strip the resistance of its popular incubator under the pressure of pain and suffering. The enemy has directed part of its media and even military arsenal to achieve the moral goal and to bring down the resistance in the eyes of its people. Unfortunately, some claim wisdom and shrewdness while they go along with the enemy's plans and goals to the end.

All the killing, destruction, and devastation that has befallen Gaza, which is beyond imagination and beyond description, does not represent a strategic burden on the Palestinian cause, as will the exit of Gaza from the national equation and the loss of the cause of its only effective, influential, and powerful tool.

Our national capital now is the legendary steadfastness of the resistance in every sense of the word, and its ability to survive. The only force we have is the force that fights in the field, and it is also alone in its field...!

Scenarios For Stopping Aggression

There are three ways for the battle to end, for us to reach the next day, and for us to open a new strategic page in our existential and ongoing struggle with the occupation.

First: The defeat and capitulation of Gaza, which is something we do not want nor expect, and all the costs that are difficult for humans and ghosts to imagine cannot push Gaza to this path at all, all the indicators do not suggest that, and the credit after Allah goes to the brave men of the resistance, who are writing a legendary defensive battle in very harsh conditions, which no resistance force has witnessed throughout modern and even ancient history, and in the shadow of a complete siege from all sides and fronts.

Second: To reach a compromise agreement formula, which represents the minimum that the resistance can accept. This agreement will be a desire by the resistance to break the violent wave of war and reduce its intensity, alleviate the enormous suffering of the people, and seize the opportunity for an urgent restoration of strength, which will give the people and the resistance a greater chance to stand firm and continue if the conflict erupts again, while the agreement does not hold up under the occupation's ambitions and fears.

We must understand and prepare ourselves that if such an agreement is reached and settled, its only meaning is that the next round will not be far away, and we should not blink or hesitate in our decision if national necessity requires us to enter into a new state of engagement with the enemy. It is absolutely not permissible for the current war to achieve distortion and awareness that makes us forget that we were and still are a liberation project to radically change the reality of the occupation, and not a project to improve the living conditions under the occupation.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

Third: The enemy will continue its aggression in the hope of consolidating its achievements and fearing their squandering, while the resistance will continue its steadfastness, and we will enter into a battle of attrition and finger-biting, the pillars of which are the resistance and the people's ability to stand firm and endure, until the enemy reaches a moment after which it is no longer able to continue using excessive force and an iron fist, and reaches the certainty that it will not be able to achieve its hoped-for goal of completely eliminating the resistance and its capabilities, and the Zionist interior will become restless about the economic, security, political, and diplomatic costs of remaining in Gaza, then the ceasefire will be a Zionist need, and the enemy will be the one in a position to make concessions to get out of the Gaza quagmire, then the national equation will be reversed, and this battle will transform from an existential threat to the resistance into a strategic victory for the cause.

Although I am strategically inclined to enter into a long war of attrition with the enemy, and this has requirements and foundations that would take too long to explain at present, I have no problem with any solution that alleviates the suffering of the people and gives them some peace and security, as long as it gives the resistance a chance to catch its breath.

Regardless of the way the war ends, with a complete or gradual withdrawal, we must be ready to resume fighting, and not be deceived by international guarantees. We must exploit every second of calm to restore our strength and prepare for an upcoming battle in anticipation of a very expected treachery from the enemy. The resistance must not abandon its caution, and people must not be stingy with the resistance in helping it to restore and strengthen the defenses and increase the ambushes.

Strategic Patience

Until now, the enemy has not succeeded in achieving its real goal from the war. The resistance has not been broken, it has not taken control, and almost all the field objectives of the lightning operations have been implemented, and it is still standing still. Everything it does has no meaning. It can enter any area with tremendous firepower, steadfast in the face of the resistance's strikes until they stop, and when it leaves, the resistance re-emerges. It has no choice but to pressure the people and be patient with the security cost and military exhaustion of the forces, in the hope that it will reap more concessions.

But how long can they be patient? And how long can they remain in a state of war? No matter how long it takes, the enemy will need to stop the state of war, their soldiers will need [a period of] calm, their settlers will need to return, and their economy will need to recover. What he has left to achieve by continuing the war is less than what they will lose if they miss out on normalization and integration projects in the region, which they consider a strategic guarantee to prolong the life of their foreign entity.

The captives are a pressure factor, but soon the families of soldiers, the families of reserve forces, the military leaders accused of war crimes, and their image in the depths of Western consciousness, which began to reflect its features, and other pressure factors to hasten the cessation of the war, even after a while.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

Even if they do not stop, their grip must loosen and their forces must slacken, and the increasing ability of the resistance to inflict losses on the enemy forces is evidence of this, even though the enemy forces mixed in the field are much less than those days. If the enemy forces slacken, our ability to exhaust them will increase, and the costs of survival will increase for them.

The war tactics were beyond the resistance's expectations, experience, or preparation. With time, the resistance has acquired and continues to acquire experiences that increase its effectiveness and make it capable of coexisting with the most difficult situation in which any resistance has been placed in history. Then, the future of days will be better for the resistance and worse for the occupier, because nothing will come that is more difficult than what has gone before.

The resistance has benefited from the enemy's vast remnants of ammunition, and has made up for much of what it used to bring through the smuggling channels that the occupation closed. From what we see and what some know, what the resistance has added to its strength in terms of explosives and barrel bombs, which is the most important and effective weapon in urban warfare, seems to be greater than what it possessed before the war.

The clock is gradually ticking, albeit slowly, to restore the resistance to some of its health under the war, and it will be more capable with any calm breeze.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

What is required is that we endure, that our provisions of patience be great, that we do not rush to make concessions, that we prepare ourselves to continue and persist, that we take the initiative and not wait for the aggression to stop, and that we establish a system that is compatible with the current reality over a relatively long period, whether on the level of resistance or on the level of managing the internal front. If the aggression stops, then that is good and well, and if it does not stop, then to wherever it goes.

I know the difficult living conditions of the people whose details we live with, and I understand the innate longing for peace and a sense of security, even for one day. I know the suffering in obtaining daily sustenance and I realize the extent of what this great, great people endure and their lack of their most basic human needs.

But we, as bearers of a national liberation project, are more in need of not being broken. Pain and sacrifices should not tame us and rob us of our will. The difference between man and beast is that his sacrifices do not push him to submit, but rather prevent him from wasting them without value as if they were a mirage.

I know that societal patience requires collective awareness, and before that it requires national responsibility from the opponents of the resistance, but even if that does not happen, the resistance has no choice but to continue on the path, and the people will be rewarded for their steadfastness, willingly or unwillingly.

We will never realize how valuable and effective our sacrifices were, as we will when a ceasefire is a need for the enemy as much as it is a demand for the resistance.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

The capabilities of the resistance that forced the enemy to withdraw in 2005, more than a year after this great mill, are still much greater than what they had on that day, with a big difference also in the experience and expertise of the resistance, and victory is not for the strongest but for the most patient.

National Sin and Historical Opportunity: "Painful Honesty"

I do not find the Palestinian cause and Gaza in particular [to be] in a crisis, except to the extent that we Palestinians create it in ourselves, and I find that our ability to achieve strategic superiority over the enemy is greater than what the enemy can achieve against us, but we as Palestinians still present a strange model, and a completely unjustified division, in light of the enemy's brutal attack, which is clear to everyone, even to the blind, the naive, the foolish, and the semi-sane on the planet and in three-quarters of the galaxy; that it does not target Gaza alone, but targets Gaza first...!

For more than a year, we as a people have allowed the battle to be between the resistance and the occupation, and a naive and hateful populist discourse has prevailed, suggesting that the people are a third party with no connection to the cause, or that they have fallen victim between two foreign conflicting parties, impatiently awaiting the end. The end of what and for what? It is not important, because the people are another party completely outside the equation.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

Throughout our lives, and in every difficult stage of the conflict, we lament the Arabs' failure to support and defend us, and we ask them to leave the box of words and go into the reality of actions. This means entering into confrontation and throwing their armies, capitals, and cities into the furnace of war for our sake, as Hezbollah did in Lebanon and Ansarallah did in Yemen. Is it reasonable that we should be the first to fail each other and the most reluctant to pay the price?! Or do we want the Arabs to fight on our behalf and pay the price?! We want them to bear the consequences of defending us even if their country is destroyed. Will we describe their defense of us as a path of recklessness or a type of madness?!

There is no doubt that the enemy contributed with all its strength, power and capabilities to cauterize the popular awareness and strengthen this self-interested discourse. Unfortunately, other Palestinian forces played an important role in disappointing the people. The prevalence of this voice also reinforced the absence of the conscious, opposing voice, which is directly targeted, or is silent by force in all public debates, because a fool can hurl a hundred doubts at you in ten minutes, while each doubt requires an hour of clarification if the dialogue is in the presence of the wise and not the ignorant. So the national voice resorts to silence, while people think that the voice of the mob, the idiots, and the fallen of the nation, is the dominant one and expresses the true pulse of the general public.

This poor populist discourse represents a major national sin, giving hope to the occupation, while exerting moral pressure on the resistance to make concessions that we may not be able to compensate for in many years.

I will not hide from you that part of the fault lies with the lackluster political discourse of the resistance, which centers the conflict around an exchange deal, instead of centering it around achieving the rights of our people, ending the suffering inflicted on our people, and breaking the siege once and for all, which provides an inspiring discourse for the people, and a hopeful one that is commensurate with their suffering.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

We, as a Palestinian people, have never paid a higher price in our history than we have today. In fact, we no longer have anything to lose, and this is in fact the greatest strength we are supposed to have possessed. There is no appropriate price for what we have paid and suffered until now except obtaining all our rights as human beings.

We are not asking the enemy to withdraw [to the borders] before October 7, nor to return the displaced to the north [of Gaza]. We are asking for an end to all forms of occupation of Gaza at least. We are asking for land, sea, and air outlets, freedom of movement and travel, and our right to benefit from our water resources. We are prepared to continue a long battle of attrition with the occupation, no matter how long it takes or how great its cost. The important thing is that we do not stop until we achieve our goals and rights without any reduction.

If we unite on one position, and relieve the resistance from the pressure that pushes it to make concessions, transfer our popular and political pressure to the enemy, and stand as Palestinians on one front against the occupation, we can then turn the equation back around, and return the conflict to its true essence. This is the will of the people, not the will of the resistance, and we as a people must be the real pressure factor on the resistance not to make concessions that affect our future or weaken our strategic position towards the enemy. We have paid enough prices, and what remains is much less than what has passed, and the enemy can perhaps confront the resistance, but they cannot confront an entire people.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

It is a historic opportunity not to waste all these prices paid, to return to the arena of political begging that has been tried before, and to return to the enemy's blackmail of us in the reconstruction and aid file. It is a historic opportunity for us to stand as one united people, in the face of the enemy, not in the face of its enemies...!

The enemy, no matter how long the battle lasts, cannot continue. When they stop, they will be the one begging us to stop the fire, and when they beg us, they will be the one who has to make concessions.

Let the negotiations over the prisoners stop, let Gaza be declared an area under occupation, and let us be in an open battle to expel the occupation, while the issue of the prisoners becomes a secondary matter that is resolved by solving the problem of the occupation, and just as we expelled it before, we will expel it later.

What we can achieve in five years of fighting, we may not be able to achieve in 20 years of negotiations, and every concession we make to stop the war, we will need years to make up for after the war, and continuing the current fighting is easier than resuming it after cessation.

The long breath [of patience], the ability to persevere and to wear down the enemy until they find that their remaining in Gaza is more costly than he can bear, is the only way to transform what the enemy wanted as an absolute victory for their [Zionist] entity into a strategic turning point for our cause.

At this point, the matter depends on the awareness and will of the people. As for the resistance, our bet on it has never failed and will never fail.

The Day After The War

No matter how long the war lasts, it must end and what is commonly called the day after the war must come, and on this day we have three main challenges.

First: It is the administrative political system in Gaza, and it must be able to fulfill the desire of the international community not to be affiliated with the political resistance faction in order to facilitate the reconstruction process that will be the [future] battle after the [current] battle. At the same time, this system is not compatible with the desires of the occupation, working under its directions or directives. In all cases, this system must not achieve the occupation with soft force unless the occupation itself achieves it with excessive force. The real guarantee for this is the resistance's exit from the battle while it is still healthy and strong, as well as the awareness of the people, or at least the awareness of supporters of the resistance with these challenges and their willingness to curb the new regime if necessary. Unfortunately, the greatest obstacle in this case will not be the occupation as much as it will be those who aspire to present themselves as a moderate alternative devoid of nails and even hooves. But they should not think too much, for the enemy that we will expel from the door will not allow them to enter disguised from the window.

Second: The position of the resistance among the Arabs, and its ability to repair itself and rebuild its strength, without clashing with the occupation and, most importantly, without clashing with the new regime. The resistance should not be in a hurry that draws the enemy's attention to the seriousness of its steps, but it must begin by repairing the solid defenses that hinder the freedom of the enemy forces to penetrate, then begin to repair the rules of engagement gradually, and this alone will be a long and arduous battle, and requires a great deal of patience and stubbornness.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

The most important challenges of the day after the war are our ability to possess pressure cards that prevent the enemy from blackmailing us in the reconstruction and aid file, and enable us to impose some demands without entering a state of war. It is not necessary for our cards to be military [related], but our hand must not be trembling.

Third: Restoring the popular incubator, alleviating its suffering, and removing the effects of the moral and psychological war waged by the occupation on the idea of resistance in the collective consciousness. This in itself is a battle no less than the battle to restore the rules of engagement, neither in terms of importance nor in terms of cost. I believe that the people of Gaza will not forget those who let them down in such an impudent manner, but the pain and suffering that people have experienced is beyond human capacity to bear. For this reason, the hand of the resistance must be kind and generous to the people. Here, the supporters of the resistance in the world must realize that the resistance's need for support and assistance on the relief and humanitarian level after the war may be greater than its need during the war, and is no less effective than supporting weapons or even offering blood.

Conclusion

I do not view the October 7 War as an offensive war, but rather as a pre-emptive strike against a war that the enemy was preparing for and waiting for the right circumstances to launch. The battle was a legendary source of pride for the Palestinian fighter, who succeeded in implementing one of the most brilliant and complex attack plans throughout ancient and modern history, and stood firm in the face of the fiercest and most brutal battle that the region had witnessed in several centuries.

Any assessment of the results of the October 7 War must not be measured by comparing the current situation with the previous situation, but rather must be measured by the enemy's strategic goals that it sought to achieve, and what it was able to achieve and what it failed to achieve.

We must not forget or neglect that we are a national liberation project, and that the liberation of Palestine will not be achieved by a knockout blow or by an ascending curve of achievements, but rather they are rounds that vary and fluctuate in strength and achievement. There is no victory except with the departure of the occupation, and all the rounds before liberation cannot be evaluated by victory or defeat, but rather they are evaluated regardless of their outcome in our favor or in favor of the enemy; the enemy did not win because we were not defeated, and as long as we are not defeated, the enemy has only achieved a mirage...!

Our loss as a national cause, if the occupation succeeds, God forbid, in its plan to completely neutralize Gaza and dismantle its resistance, is much greater than all the material and human losses we have suffered, despite their enormity and magnitude. Therefore, any image of the end of the battle must be the day after it, allowing the resistance to rebuild itself and restore its strength.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

We are capable of transforming what the enemy wanted as an absolute victory for its entity into a strategic turning point for our cause, provided that we all assume national responsibility and all line up behind the resistance to the occupier. This requires a long breath of patience, steadfastness, and the ability to continue confronting and exhausting the enemy, until the moment when it despairs of remaining in Gaza and finds itself forced under the weight of the cost to withdraw.

The enemy state, which is proud of what it considers strategic achievements on several regional fronts, is still surrounded by powerful enemies capable of regaining their health, and will remain in a state of existential fear of threats to its survival, as it is still a foreign entity in the region, and any change in the surrounding regimes, especially Egypt or Jordan, will evaporate all these achievements as if they were a mirage.

As a summary of the battle in Gaza, the war, similar to which could have brought down countries in a few days, has inflicted considerable damage on the capabilities and capacities of the resistance, but it was unable to achieve the strategic goal of removing Gaza from the calculations of tactical or strategic threats.

My conviction, based on analyzing matters and knowing some of their secrets, is that the resistance in Gaza, at the worst, and at the end of this battle in which the enemy used the maximum of its energy and strength, will be stronger than it was at the end of the 2014 battle, with a big difference in experience, and it will be able to recover its health more quickly.

Al-Aqsa Flood...Contexts and Implications

When the war ends, Gaza will be busy healing its wounds and restoring its strength, and the enemy will be busy with the storm of internal disputes that will deepen its wounds and weaken its fabric. Just as the October 7 attack was amazing to everyone, the recovery of the resistance will be amazing and surprising. These are not the wishes of dreamers, but the certainty of workers.

And praise be to Allah, Lord of the Worlds

طوفان الأقصى



2025م